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BROWNFIELDS: A LENDER'S SAFE HAVEN?
J. ANDREW SMITH*

Environmental liability should be one of the most important
considerations for lenders in deciding whether to finance the
redevelopment or improvement of areas known as "brownfields." This
great importance stems from Congress' enactment of the

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA or Superfund'). CERCLA creates possible unlimited

liability for any potentially responsible parties (PRPs) in the form of
joint, several, strict, and retroactive liability for the entire cost of an
environmental cleanup.2 PRPs may also be subject to unlimited liability
for costs of responding to the actual or threatened release of hazardous

substances into the environment. 3 A PRP is defined by the following
four categories:

(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any
hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at

which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement or
otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment, or

arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or
treatment of hazardous substances owned or possessed

by such person, by any other party or entity, at any
facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by
'Executive Editor, Journal of Natural Resources & Environmental Law, J.D. expected
1999, University of Kentucky; B.S. in Accounting, 1996, University of Kentucky; A.A., 1994,
Cypress College.
'See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (as amended by the Superfund Amendments
and Reauthorization Act ("SARA"), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986)). Lenders are not
expressly exposed to strict liability, rather the courts have adopted this standard. See, e.g., New
York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1039 (2d Cir. 1985); Leslie Goff-Sanders, Brownfield
Legislation: A Viable Optionfor the Southeast, 12 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 141, 141
(1996-97). Lenders may be found strictly liable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §9607(a)(2) which defines
a responsible party "any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or
operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of ......
'Derek Mohr, Comment, Comment On the Application of CERCLA to Noncorporate
Entities: An Analysis of the Redwing Decisions,47 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1157 (1997).
'Ben A. Hagood, Jr., Congress Clarifies Lender LiabilityforPolluted Property,S.C.
LAW., May-June 1997, at 24. These response costs may include substantial monetary outlays for
determining the amount and/or existence of any environmental contamination as well as any
necessary remediation of polluted sites. Id.
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another party or entity and containing such hazardous
substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous

substances for transport to disposal or treatment
facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such
person, from which there is a release, or a threatened
release....'

The four categories of CERCLA liability apply to any "person"
where "person" is defined as "an individual, firm, corporation,
association, partnership, consortium, joint venture, commercial entity,
United States Government, State, municipality, commission, political
subdivision of a State, or any interstate body." 5 There are very few
statutory defenses to liability for a responsible party under CERCLA,
and in practice these defenses are used very rarely.6
Although CERCLA, at first glance, appears to create an

inescapable net of liability, it provides lenders a special exemption from
liability.7 Despite the fact that this exemption exists for lenders, there
'42 U.S.C. §9607(a) (1994).
542 U.S.C. § 9601(21); Mohr, supra note 2.
6Mohr, supra note 2.
742 U.S.C. §9601(20)(E)-(F). The 1996 Amendment toCERCLA (effectively codifying
the EPA's lender liability rule) states the following:
(E) Exclusion of lenders not participants in management
(i) Indicia of ownership to protect security
The term "owner or operator" does not include a person that is a lender that, without
participating in the management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership
primarily to protect the security interest of the person in the vessel or facility.
(ii) Foreclosure
The term "owner or operator" does not include a person that is a lender that did not
participate in management of a vessel or facility prior to foreclosure, notwithstanding
that the person(I) forecloses on the vessel or facility; and
(II) after foreclosure, sells, re-leases (in the case of a lease finance
transaction), or liquidates the vessel or facility, maintains business
activities, winds up operations, undertakes a response action under section
9607(d)(1) of this title or under the direction of an on-scene coordinator
appointed under the National Contingency Plan, with respect to the vessel
or facility, or takes any other measure to preserve, protect, or prepare the
vessel or facility prior to sale or disposition,
if the person seeks to sell, re-lease (in the case of a lease finance transaction), or
otherwise divest the person of the vessel or facility at the earliest practical,
commercially reasonable time, on commercially reasonable terms, taking into account
market conditions and legal and regulatory requirements.
(F) Participation in Management
For purposes of subparagraph (E)(I) the term "participate in management"(I) means actually participating in the management or operational affairs of
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is still a substantial hesitation on the part of the lending community to
lend money for the purchase and/or redevelopment of land known as
"brownfields." Evidence of this hesitation can be found in a recent
statement made by Joseph Mainous, Sr., Chairman of the Board of First
Federal Savings and Loan Association. Mainous stated that "where

there is any possibility of environmental pollution, banks will generally
require evidence that such environmental pollution is not present, and

if that evidence cannot be shown or if evidence of any pollution is
8
found, banks will generally not lend money on these properties."

To fully understand the issues surrounding lender liability in
brownfields, one must first address four important questions. First,
what are brownfields? Second, how substantial is the chilling effect
upon the financing of brownfields redevelopment projects? Third, why
should the public be concerned about this substantial chilling effect
caused by CERCLA? Most importantly, what strives have been made

towards eliminating, reducing, or clarifying lender liability in
brownfields?
First, what are brownfields? The United States Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) defines brownfields as "abandoned, idled or

underused industrial and commercial sites where expansion or
redevelopment is complicated by real or perceived environmental
contamination that can add cost, time or uncertainty to a redevelopment
a vessel or facility; and
(II) does not include merely having the capacity to influence, or the
unexercised right to control, vessel or facility operations;
(ii) a person that is a lender and that holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect
a security interest in a vessel or facility shall be considered to participate in
management only if, while the borrower is still in possession of the vessel or facility
encumbered by the security interest, the person(1) exercises decision making control over the environmental compliance
related to the vessel or facility, such that the person has undertaken
responsibility for the hazardous substance handling or disposal practices
related to the vessel or facility, or
(II) exercises control at a level comparable to that of a manager of the
vessel or facility, such that the person has assumed or manifested
responsibility(aa) for the overall management of the vessel or facility
encompassing day-to-day decisionmaking with respect to
environmental compliance; or
(bb) over all or substantially all of the operational functions (as
distinguished from financial or administrative functions) of the
vessel or facility other than the function of environmental
compliance.
8
Telephone Interview with Joseph Mainous, Sr., Chairman ofthe Board ofFirst Federal
Savings & Loan Assoc. (Nov. 10, 1997).
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Similarly, the Hoffman Report, an Internet service

specializing in offering resources on brownfields, defines them as
"vacant, abandoned or under-utilized commercial and industrial
properties where the fear of unknown environmental liability is a
serious obstacle to their successful redevelopment or improvement."' l
Second, how substantial is this chilling effect upon the
financing of brownfields? The May 1995 Bankers Roundtable survey"
revealed a substantial chilling effect in the financing of brownfields
redevelopment due to environmentaljurisprudence in the area of lender
liability under CERCLA."2 This survey showed that forty percent of
responding banks "automatically designate areas near Superfund sites

as suspect in terms of environmental liability." 3 This effect is due to
lenders'desire to avoid possible loss in the value of property used as
security in the case of foreclosure, as well as possible lender liability

for cleanup costs.'"
Third, why should we care that such a chilling effect has
resulted? The chilling effect on the financing of the redevelopment of
brownfields has resulted in significant waste. Examples of waste
include: 1) the unnecessary and excessive development of
uncontaminated property that has not been used previously for

commercial or industrial activities 5 known as "greenfields"' 6 that may
lead to further unnecessary contamination of land; 2) the abandonment
or under-use, of as many as 450,000 contaminated commercial and
'Todd S. Davis & Kevin D. Margolis, Defining the Brownfields Problem in
BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REDEVELOPING CONTAMINATED PROPERTY (Todd
S. Davis & Kevin D. Margolis eds. 1997)[hereinafter BROWNFIELDS: ACOMPREHENSIVE GUIDE].
"Paul J. Schoff, From Fear to Promise: New Help for Brownfields, BUS. L. TODAY,
May-June 1997, at 24, 25.
"Margaret Murphy, Brownfields Sites: Removing Lender Concerns as a Barrier to
Redevelopment in BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supranote 9, at102, citing BANKERS
ROUNDTABLE, ROUNDTABLE SURVEY: ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY OF SECURED PARTIES AND
FIDUCIARIES I (May 1995). The Bankers Roundtable consists of 125 of the largest United States
Banking Companies, holding roughly 70 percent of the banking assets in the United States.
"See generally42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (as amended by the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act ("SARA"), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986)). Lenders are not
expressly exposed to strict liability, rather the courts have adopted this standard. See, e.g., New
York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1039 (2d Cir. 1985); Goff-Sanders, supra note 1, at
141. Lenders may be found strictly liable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) which defines a
responsible party "any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or
operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of ......
"Murphy, supra note 11, at 102.
4
Telephone interview with Joseph Mainous, Sr., supra note 8.
"Davis & Margolis, supra note 9, at 5.
16Id.

BROWNFIELDS: A LENDER'S SAFE HAVEN?

1997-98]

industrial brownfields sites around the country 7 that could potentially
be used for successful commercial ventures or recreational purposes; 3)
a substantial loss of tax revenue to the cities where brownfields are
located; 8 and 4) the loss of greatly needed economic opportunities,
9
such as jobs, to citizens of the communities containing brownfields.'
Most importantly, what strives have been made towards
eliminating, reducing, or clarifying lender liability in brownfields? A
key element in the advancement of brownfields redevelopment projects
2
is the elimination of banks' reluctance to lend money to these projects. "
This hesitation can be overcome through the clarification of lender
liability in brownfields and the reduction or elimination of lender
liability from brownfields redevelopment. Congress' enactment of the
1996 Amendment to CERCLA known as the Asset Conservation,
Lender Liability, and Deposit Insurance Protection Act of 1996 (1996
Act),2 ' and the 1996 United States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals case
of Kelley ex rel. Michigan Natural Resources Commission v.
Tiscornia22 are two great milestones in the strive toward minimizing
lender liability in brownfields. In Kelley, the Sixth Circuit ruled on
whether the defendant, Manufacturers National Bank of Detroit (Bank),
should be held liable as an owner or operator, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
9607(a)(2),23 for the costs incurred by the plaintiff, the State of
Michigan, in its cleanup of two contaminated and vacated factory sites
located in both St. Joseph and Benton Harbor, Michigan. The cite had
been owned and operated by the Bank's borrower, Automobile
Specialties Manufacturing Company (Auto Specialties) since 1916.24
Part I of this Comment describes the legal background
regarding the issue of lender liability under CERCLA and explains the
procedural posture of Kelley. Then Part H1explains the Sixth Circuit's
reasoning in Kelley and its effect on the issue of lender liability in
brownfields. Part I] discusses some of the ambiguities created by the
Sixth Circuit's opinion in Kelley. Finally, Part IV suggests
'11d. at6.
"Id. The estimated loss to 33 cities in the United States with brownfields from this lack
of redevelopment ranges from $121 million to $386 million.
191d.

"0Murphy, supra note II, at 100.
2142 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(E)-(F).
"Kelley ex rel. Michigan Natural Resources Comm'n v. Tiscomia, No. 94-1403, 1996
WL 732323 (6th Cir. Dec. 19, 1996).
131d. at *1.
1d. Automobile Specialties was owned by the other defendants in Kelley, members
of the Tiscomia Family.
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supplemental means for lenders to avoid direct liability under CERCLA
for remediation and cleanup costs flowing from environmental
contamination.
I. CRITICAL EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE SIXTH

CIRCUIT'S DECISION IN KELLEY

A. Statutory Development of Lender Liability in Brownfields
Congress enacted CERCLA 2 in 1980, interalia,26 in an attempt
to make the parties responsible for the release of hazardous toxic wastes
liable for the costs incurred from the cleanup of properties
contaminated by these pollutants.27 Pursuant to CERCLA, liability
exists where there is a release or a threatened release at a facility of a
hazardous substance causing the plaintiff to incur response costs, and
when the defendant is a responsible party.28 The statute further provides
that a responsible party is "any person who at the time of disposal of
any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which such
hazardous substances were disposed....
As part of CERCLA, Congress included an exemption for
lenders which explicitly excludes any persons from liability who
"without participating in the management of a vessel or facility, hold
indicia of ownership primarily to protect securing interests in the vessel
or facility."30 Courts, however, have inconsistently interpreted this
secured creditor exemption. In the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
case UnitedStatesv. FleetFactorsCorp.,3 the defendant, Fleet Factors
Corporation (Fleet Factors), was forced to foreclose on its security
interest in equipment and inventory belonging to its debtor, Swainsboro
Print Works, because Swainsboro filed for protection under chapter
seven of the United States Bankruptcy Code.32 The Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) then found hazardous waste on the land
"See
generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75.
6
' Congress enacted CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et. seq., in 1980 to "provide for

liability, compensation, cleanup, and emergency response for hazardous substances released into
the environment and the cleanup of inactive hazardous waste disposal sites." Pub. L.No. 96-5 10,
94 Stat. 2767 (1980).
'7See H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6136.
2g 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
"Kelley ex reL Michigan Natural Resources Comm'n v. Tiscomia, 810 F. Supp. 901,
905 (W.D Mich. 1993) (quoting 42 U.S.C § 9607(a)).
0
ld. (quoting 42 U.S.C § 9607(a)(2)).
"United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (11 th Cir. 1990).
"Id. at 1552.
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where Swainsboro was operating its business and incurred
approximately $400,000 in cleanup costs. 3 To reclaim the expenses
it incurred in the cleanup of the contaminated sites, the EPA sued Fleet
Factors."
The Eleventh Circuit held that the burden of proving
eligibility under the secured creditor exemption was on the lender. In
addition, the court stated that a lender could be held liable without
being an operator of the facility if the lender was found to have
participated in the "financial management of a facility to a degree
indicating a capacity to influence the corporation's treatment of
hazardous wastes." 35 The court also held that the lender did not have
to engage itself in the day-to-day operations of the facility to be found
liable. 6
Contrary to the result in FleetFactorswas the outcome reached
by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in In re Bergsoe Metal Corp.37
In this case, the East Asiatic Company (EAC) sued the Port of St.
Helens to recover costs for an environmental cleanup of hazardous
waste released byBergsoe Metals (Bergsoe) in its operation ofa facility
operated on land in which the Port had a security interest.38 The basis
of EAC's claim was that the Port participated in the actual management
of Bergsoe by its actions of negotiating and encouraging the building
of the plant operated by Bergsoe.39 In contrast to the ruling in Fleet
Factors,the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Bergsoe, interpreted the
secured creditor exemption to require "actual management of the
facility before a secured creditor will fall outside the exception." 0
The expansive language used by the Eleventh Circuit in Fleet
Factorscreated uncertainty in the lending community and opened the
door to a great degree of liability for lenders who had interests in
potentially contaminated properties.4 ' Additionally, the lack of
consistency between the courts in the interpretation of the secured
creditor exemption caused substantial discomfort to lenders-surveys
showed that lenders "curtailed loans made to certain classes of
borrowers or secured by some types of properties in order to avoid the
33

1d. at 1553.

341d

"Id. at 1557.
361d. at 1557-58.
7
" Hill v. East Asiatic Co. In re Bergsoe Metal Corp., 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990).
3"ld at 671,
31d. at 672.
40Id.
4'Ben A. Hagood, Jr., Congress ClarifiesLender Liabilityfor PollutedProperty,8-Jun
S.C. Law. 24,24 (1997).
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virtually unlimited liability risk associated with collateral property that
may be contaminated. 42 Surveys also revealed that many lenders
"even chose to abandon collateral properties rather than foreclosing on
them for fear of post foreclosure liability. '
In 1992, the EPA responded to the banking community's
concerns by attempting to clarify the meaning of the secured creditor
exemption. It promulgated a rule, commonly known as the "lender
liability rule"," which provided that actual participation in management
45
was required for there to be liability imposed upon the lender. The
rule further provided that participation in management may be found in
one of the following three ways: 1) when the lender exercised decision
making control over the borrower's environmental compliance; or 2)
when the lender assumed or manifested responsibility for the overall
management of the enterprise encompassing day-to-day decision
making of the enterprise with respect to environmental compliance; or
3) when the lender assumed or manifested responsibility for the overall
management of the enterprise encompassing day-to-day decision
making with respect to all, or substantially all, of the operational
aspects of the enterprise other than environmental compliance, as
46
opposed to financial or administrative aspects of the business. The
EPA intended to protect lenders from exposure to liability for actions
taken by the lender in its ordinary course of business while also
imposing liability for lenders' actual management over a debtor's
facility. 47 The lender liability rule also provided guidance on what preloan work and policing the lender could perform without being
considered a participant in management.4
Thereafter, in Kelley v. EPA,49 the state of Michigan along with
the Chemical Manufacturers Association, filed a petition in the District
of Columbia Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals for review
of the EPA's lender liability rule. The petitioners were seeking to avoid
'432Kelley

v. EPA, 15 F.3d 1100, 1104 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
1d
"Id.
"4Kelleyex rel. Michigan Natural Resources Comm'n v. Tiscomia, 810 F. Supp. 901,
906 (W.D. Mich. 1993).
461d. (citing 40 C.F.R. 300.1 101(C)(I)(i)(B)).
4'Hagood, supra note 3, at 25. Federal Courts, after the EPA's promulgation of the
lender liability rule, began to apply the rule to clarify when a lender was partaking in a lender's
ordinary course of business and when a lender was actively managing hazardous waste facilities.
Id. (citing Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Sonford Prods. Corp., 810 F. Supp 1057 (D Minn- 1993)).
481d
49Kelley v. EPA, 15 F.3d 1100, 1103 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1110
(1995).
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being precluded from suing lenders for cleanup costs arising under
CERCLA.5 0 CERCLA5" mandates that the District of Columbia Circuit
has "exclusive jurisdiction to review any regulation promulgated under
[CERCLA]."52 In this case, the court ruled that the EPA does not have
the statutory authority to define, through its regulation, the scope of
lender liability and that only federal courts may adjudicate the issue of
lender liability under CERCLA.53
Despite the court's ruling in Kelley v. EPA, Congress codified
the lender liability rule as the Asset Conservation, Lender Liability, and
Deposit Insurance Protection Act of 1996 (1996 Act). 4 Evidence of the
similarities between the lender liability rule and the 1996 Act can be
shown by the treatment of these two provisions by the Sixth Circuit in
Kelley v. Tiscornia. The court stated:
[a] comparison of the amendments to CERCLA
relevant here and the EPA 'lender liability rule' under
which the district court decided this case makes it clear
that these amendments . . . are expressly made
applicable to any claim 'that has not been finally
adjudicated as of the date of enactment of this Act."
Although the 1996 Act effectively codified the lender liability
rule, there are some important differences. For example, the Act does
not adopt 40 C.F.R. § 300.100, which is the secured lender exemption."
However, the lender liability rule's "secured lender exemption is very
similar to the lender liability provisions of the Act, and obviously the
Act was drafted with the EPA Rule as a guide.""' Another important
difference between the two provisions is found in the area of
foreclosure." Under the lender liability rule, a holder of a security
interest could avoid liability as an owner or operator if the lender listed
and advertised the property for sale within twelve months of

Mid.

at 1104.

"CERCLA § 113(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(a).
2

" Kelley, 15 F.3d at 1104.
"Id. at 1105-09.
42 U.S.C. § 9601 (20)(E)-(F).
"Kelley ex rel.Michigan Natural Resources Comm'n v. Tiscornia, No. 94-1403, 1996
WL 732323, at *2 (6th Cir. Dec. 19, 1996) (quoting Pub. L. No. 104-2-8, §§ 2505).
mBaxter Dunaway & Andrew C. Cooper, Good News for Lenders and Fiduciaries
Under Superfund, PROB. & PROP., May-June 1997, at 49, 50-51.
"d.
uId.
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foreclosure. 9 The rule also provided that the lender would lose the
exemption if the lender rejected or failed to act within ninety days on
a written bona fide offer for reasonable consideration for the property.6"
On the other hand, the 1996 Act provides that if the lender, after
foreclosure, "seeks to sell, re-lease (in the case of a lease finance
transaction), or otherwise divest the person of the vessel or the facility
at the earliest practicable, commercially reasonable time, on
commercially reasonable terms," then the lender will be exempt from
liability under the Act.6" The practical effect of this is that the lender
may either sell or re-lease the property and in any given case there will
be less certainty as to whether the lender has taken reasonable measures
to dispose of the property. Although a lack of certainty is rarely a
positive attribute within environmental law, the lender liability
exemption under the 1996 Act in some cases may be an exception to
this rule. Such an exception may exist because the lender liability
exemption may still apply, in some cases, to a lender that failed to sell
or accept an offer within ninety days after receiving a bone fide offer
to buy contaminated property.
B. Procedural Posture of Kelley v. Tiscornia
The State of Michigan first filed its complaint against the
Manufacturers National Bank of Detroit (Bank) in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Michigan in an effort to
recover the costs it incurred in the cleanup of environmental pollution
found on the property formerly owned by the Bank's borrower,
Automobile Specialties. The state of Michigan sued the Bank on the
assumption that the Bank would be liable as a subsequent owner of the
property as the result of the Bank's enforcement of its security interest
in the property. 2 Upon cross-motions for summary judgment by both
the Bank and the State, the district court granted summary judgment in
favor of the Bank on the issue of the Bank's conduct regarding
59

1d.
'Old
"Id. (quoting Asset Conservation, Lender Liability, and Deposit Insurance Protection
Act of 1996,2Pub. L. No. 104-208).
1 Automobile Specialties filed for bankruptcy in 1988. Its chapter 11 proceeding was
converted to a Chapter 7 proceeding in 1990. Kelley ex rel. Michigan Natural Resources Comm'n
v. Tiscomia, No. 94-1403, 1996 WL 732323, at * 1 n.2 (6th Cir. Dec. 19, 1996). The State sought
recovery of costs relating to the environmental cleanup of a factory site in St. Joseph and Benton
Harbor, Michigan, and were owned and operated by Automobile Specialties since 1916. Id
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Automobile Specialties' facilities. 63 The court found that the Bank's
conduct fell within the scope of the secured creditor exemption as a
result of the EPA's promulgation of the lender liability rule 64 that
interpreted the secured creditor exemption found in CERCLA. As
previously discussed, this regulation required participation in the
management of the company responsible for releasing the toxic waste
for a party to be found liable for costs incurred from the cleanup ofthis
toxic waste .65 The State of Michigan then appealed the district court's
ruling in Kelley.

11.

THE SIXTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION AND REASONING IN KELLEY AND
ITS EFFECT ON THE ISSUE OF
LENDER LIABILITY IN BROWNFIELDS

A. Summary of the Sixth Circuit's Ruling and Rationale in Kelley
On appeal to the Sixth Circuit, the State of Michigan argued
that the district court had committed reversible error by failing to grant
a motion for reconsideration. The State of Michigan based its appeal
on the fact that the district court's prior ruling was grounded in the
lender liability rule that was promulgated by the EPA but was later
found to have exceeded the EPA's authority.66 The Sixth Circuit was
quick to point out in its opinion, however, that the 1996 Amendment to
CERCLA was effectively a codification of the EPA's lender liability
rule 67 and that this amendment governs any claim "that has not been
finally adjudicated as of the date of enactment of this Act."68
Therefore, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling in Kelley
63

1d

'Kelley ex reL Michigan Natural Resources Comm'n v. Tiscomia, 810 F. Supp. 901,
905 (W.D. Mich. 1993).
6Kelleyexrel. Michigan Natural Resources Comm'n v. Tiscomia, No. 94-1403, 1996
WL 732323, at *2 (6th Cir. Dec. 19, 1996).
"Kelley v. EPA, 15 F.3d 1100, 1108-09 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
7
Pursuant to Pub. L. No. 104-208 § 2504, Congress stated that "the final rule issued

by the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency on April 29, 1992 (57 Fed. Reg.
18,344), prescribing section 300.1105 of title 40 Code of Federal Regulations shall be deemed to

have been validly issued under authority of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675) and to have been effective
according to the terms of the final rule." CERCLA, as originally enacted by Congress, further

states that "the term 'owner or operator' does not include a person that is a lender that, without
participating in the management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to
protect the security interest of the person in the vessel or facility." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(E).
"Kelley ex rel Michigan Natural Resources Comm'n v. Tiscornia, No. 94-1403, 1996
WL 732323, at *2 (6th Cir, Dec. 19, 1996).
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because it found that the lower court had properly applied the lender
liability rule. The importance of this decision can be found in an
analysis of the Sixth Circuit's application of the 1996 Act in Kelley and
the effect that this application has on the issue of lender liability in
brownfields.
B. Analysis of the Sixth Circuit's Decision in Kelley v. Tiscornia and
Its Effects on the Issue of Lender Liability in Brownfields
In Kelley, the Sixth Circuit agreed with the district court's
conclusion that the material facts were undisputed as to the issue of
whether the Bank was "participating in management" as defined by the
part of EPA's lender liability rule69 effectively codified by the 1996
Act. The court upheld the district court's decision to grant summary
judgment in favor of the Bank. The court also agreed with the district
court's finding that there was insufficient evidence presented by the
State in its attempt to prove the Bank's "overall day-to-day management
of [Automobile Specialties] with respect to all, or substantially all of
. . . [Automobile Specialties'] operational aspects other than
environmental compliance."7 Rather, the Sixth Circuit found that the
Bank's conduct in relation to Automobile Specialties was financial or
administrative in nature as opposed to reaching the level of being
actually operational. 7
The district court performed its analysis of the Bank's actions
by dividing the actions into two time periods. The first period ran from
1964, the beginning of the commercial relationship between the Bank
and Automobile Specialties, to August 6, 1986. During this time, the
representatives of the Bank served as directors of Automobile
Specialties.72 The second period ran from August of 1986 to June 30,
1988, during which time the turnaround specialist recommended by the
Bank worked for Automobile Specialties.73
Shortly after the beginning of the commercial relationship
between Lester Tiscomia (one of Automobile Specialties' primary
shareholders) and the Bank, Tiscornia successfully seized control of
Automobile Specialties with the Bank's assistance and appointed a
691d.
'Old
"Id
"Kelley ex rt. Michigan Natural Resources Comm'n v. Tiscomia, 810 F. Supp. 901,
905 (W.D. Mich. 1993).
73Id.
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Bank officer to Automobile Specialties' Board of Directors.7 4 The
annual board meetings involved issues primarily related to Automobile
Specialties' pension plans and capital spending, and the Bank had no
Automobile
other involvement with the Board of Directors.
for making
not
responsible
was
Specialties' Board of Directors
decisions regarding the corporation's daily operations; rather, the
executive committee, made up of only inside directors, was exclusively
responsible for these decisions.
Therefore, Sixth Circuit's decision not to find actual
management by the Bank suggests that a lender may have its own
members on the debtor's board of directors and that such directors may
participate in meetings on a regular basis. Furthermore, a lender's
representative serving on the debtor's board may also exercise decision
making authority over issues involving capital spending and pensions.
To stay abreast of its financial status during the first period, the
Bank also appointed two account officers to Automobile Specialties.7"
Therefore, the 1996 Act, pursuant to the Sixth Circuit's decision in
Kelley, also protects the act of appointing account officers for the
purpose of keeping the lender informed as to the financial status of the
debtor.
In 1985, the Bank decided to enter into two additional financing
arrangements with Automobile Specialties. These agreements required
the following: 1)daily reporting by Automobile Specialties to the Bank,
2) disallowance of any financing from any other source but the Bank,
while liens were created on Automobile Specialties' machinery and
equipment, and 3) prohibition on Automobile Specialties from
distributing any dividends.76 This arrangement also enabled the Bank
to monitor the accounts receivable and cash received on a daily basis.77
The court in Kelley held that these activities were insufficient to deny
the Bank protection under the 1996 Act.7" In summary, a lender may
receive daily financial reports from a debtor, may maintain control of
the decision of the debtor company to distribute dividends, and may
continually monitor the debtor's financial status, and still be protected
by the 1996 Act.
Beginning in 1986, which marked the second period addressed
by the court in Kelley, the Bank increased the number of meetings it
I7541d at 903.
1d
76
1d
77Id.
7

91d.
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was having with Automobile Specialties to discuss cost reductions and
changes in management.79 During these meetings, the Bank made all
further financing of Automobile Specialties contingent upon the use of
outside management and upon the condition that Tiscornia be dropped
from the payroll."0 Additionally, the Bank threatened to call its loan to
Automobile Specialties if it did not meet these contingencies.8 '
Automobile Specialties employed the services of an outside turnaround
specialist recommended by the Bank. 82 This turnaround specialist also
received an incentive bonus financed by the Bank and designed to give
compensation to the specialist based on his reduction of the debt owed
to the Bank by Automobile Specialties.83 The Bank exerted extreme
influence over Automobile Specialties, and the specialist recommended
by the Bank was responsible for the day-to-day operations at
Automobile Specialties.
Despite the Bank's increased involvement with Automobile
Specialties' business affairs, the court found the Bank's increasingly
frequent attendance at Automobile Specialties directors' meetings to be
insufficient evidence of the Bank's participation in management as
required to eliminate the Bank's protection under the 1996 Act."
Furthermore, the Kelley court held that meetings attended by the lender
held for the purpose of changing management or reducing costs are not
sufficient management activities to increase the lender's exposure to
liability for clean up costs.8 5 Thus, lenders may frequently and
regularly attend a debtor's board meetings and use the lender's
influence to set the debtor's cost reductions and management changes.
As shown by its holding in Kelley, the Sixth Circuit supports the idea
that Congress intended, through the 1996 Amendment to CERCLA, to
reverse the Ninth Circuit's decision in Fleet Factors,86 which made the
lender's mere capacity to influence operational decisions of the debtor
sufficient evidence of management for lender liability. 7

79

1d

'"Id.
811d.
'2Id. at 903.
'd. at 904.
'Id.
85d.
"United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (1 lth Cir. 1990).
'See supraPart I.A.

1997-98]
III.

BROWNFIELDS: A LENDER'S SAFE HAVEN?
AMBIGUITIES CREATED BY THE SIXTH CIRCUIT'S

DECISION IN KELLEY

Even though the Sixth Circuit's decision in Kelley illustrates
many types of lender conduct that will probably fall within CERCLA's
lender exemption, there are still several issues involving lender liability
in brownfields that remain ambiguous as the result of the court's
opinion. For instance, the first of the undisputed facts found by the
district court in Kelley, and later adopted by the Sixth Circuit's ruling
in Kelley was the State of Michigan's failure to allege that the Bank
exercised decision making control over the environmental compliance
function of Automobile Specialties. Michigan also failed to allege that
the Bank took "responsibility for the overall management of the day-today decision making of [Automobile Specialties] with respect to
environmental compliance.""8 Unfortunately, the State's failure to
allege these facts hindered the Sixth Circuit's ability to apply this part
of the rule and prevents lenders from seeing how a court might rule on
the issue of control over the debtor's environmental compliance
decisions.
However, guidance on this issue was presented by the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan in Z & Z
Leasing,Inc. v. Graying Reel, Inc.89 Although this case was heard by
a different U.S. District Court than the Kelley case, both districts are
subject to Sixth Circuit precedents. The cases involve similar facts'
and the same defendant, the Manufacturers National Bank of Detroit. 9'
It is helpful, therefore, to look at the Eastern District's decision in
Z& ZLeasingto shed light on what the ruling of the Sixth Circuit and
other courts might be on the issue of environmental compliance.
Z & ZLeasing involved a 70,000 square foot facility located on
a six acre site in the Canton Township in Michigan.92 Z & Z Leasing
acquired this property through the issuance of a letter of credit provided
"Kelley exrel. Michigan Natural Resources Comm'n v. Tiscornia, No. 94-1403, 1996
WL 732323, at *2 (6th Cir. Dec. 19, 1996).
"Z&Z Leasing, Inc. v. Graying Reel, Inc., 873 F. Supp. 51 (E.D. Mich. 1995).
'Both Kelley and Z & Z Leasing involve the issue of lender liability in the case of
lenders who have not yet foreclosed on the property in which the lenders held an interest when
liability was alleged. Id. at 52-3.
"Although the court names the defendant in its case title as Comerica Bank, the
defendant isreferred to as Manufacturers National Bank of Detroit in the opinion. This is due to
the successor in interest to Manufacturers by reason of a bank merger. Id. at 52.
Comerica being
2
9 1d
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by the Manufacturers National Bank of Detroit.93 The Bank held a
mortgage to this property. Later, as a result of a routine environmental
assessment, the Bank found that a hazardous substance had been
released from underground storage tanks.' One of the primary issues
addressed in this case was whether the Bank's actions in the area of
environmental compliance invoked liability for cleanup costs. 9 In its
decision regarding this issue, the court observed the following:
[T]he Bank's requiring plaintiff to abide by all
applicable environmental laws does not constitute
"operation" of the Property. Nor does the Bank's
request for environmental investigation of possible
contamination to the Property securing its interest
constitute the requisite involvement necessary to incur
operator liability. The record reflects that the Bank
took prudent and routine steps to protect its security
interest only, and the court will not punish the Bank
for its insistence that plaintiff obey the law.96
Therefore, the lender can take measures to comply with environmental
laws to protect its security interest in the debtor's property and can
require the debtor to comply with environmental law without a
significant fear of being held liable for the costs of cleanup or response
to environmental hazards.
Another issue that was not clearly addressed within Kelley is
whether the lender can use its influence to the extent that it replaces a
senior level manager or officer with a representative of the lender to
give the lender direct control over the operations of the debtor's
business. Nevertheless, the 1996 Amendment to CERCLA states that
a lender is outside the scope of the lender exemption if the lender
assumes or manifests responsibility for the overall management of the
enterprise encompassing day-to-day decision making with respect to all,
or substantially all, of the operational aspects of the enterprise other
than environmental compliance, as opposed to financial or
administrative aspects of the business." This rule states that the
93

1d.

"Id. at 53.
951d. at 55-6.
96d.

97Kllcy ex ret. Michigan Natural Resources Comm'n v. Tiscomia, 810 F. Supp. 901,
906 (W.D. Mich. 1993) (citing 40 C.F.R. 300.1 101(C)(1)(i)(B)).
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exemption still applies if the direct management of the debtor by a
representative of the lender concerns only the financial or
administrative aspects of the debtors business and not the day-to-day
operations.
Although the court in Kelley observes that a lender may have
a representative member on the debtor's board of directors, the court
leaves ambiguous the degree to which the lender's representative may
exercise decision making authority through the directors voting
process.9" The 1996 Act states that the lender is only exempt from
liability if the Bank's representative does not exercise the following:
control at a level comparable to that of a manager of
the vessel or facility, such that the person has assumed
or manifested responsibility ...

[for the] overall or

substantially all of the operational functions (as
distinguished from financial or administrative
functions) of the vessel or facility other than the
function of environmental compliance."
Arguably, the traditional role of a board of directors is not over the
operational matters of a corporation. This, of course, is the purpose for
which the board of directors appoints officers. Nonetheless, corporate
directors often times make decisions that concern the management of
a corporation.
Z & Z Leasing provides some clarity on the issue of the degree
to which a director can participate in a board's voting without falling
outside of the protection of the 1996 Act. The court in Z & Z Leasing
ruled that the lender would not attain operator status under CERCLA
even if substantial decision making authority over the debtor's
operations is transferred to the lender by the debtor. For example, if the
lender mandated that the debtor receive consent from the lender prior
to performing several enumerated functions, this would not result in the
lender being deemed an operator under CERCLA. The functions over
which the Z & Z Leasing court allowed the lender to exercise decision
making authority are the following: 1)Amending operative documents;
2) merging or selling assets, etc.; 3) incurring indebtedness; 4)
guaranteeing obligations; 5) purchasing assets or stock; 6) creating or
"Kelley ex rel. Michigan Natural Resources Comm'n v. Tiscomia, No. 94-1403, WL
732323 (6th Cir. Dec. 19, 1996).
"42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(F)(ii)(ll(bb).
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incurring liens, etc.; 7) making loans; 8) purchasing or leasing fixed
assets; 9) purchasing, redeeming or acquiring its capital stock; 10)
declaring or paying dividends; and 11) purchasing or holding
securities."° Based on the court's decision in Z & ZLeasing,the lender
has great freedom to exercise direct decision making authority over the
financial operations of the debtor, while the lender acts as a director for
the debtor.
IV. SUPPLEMENTAL MEANS THROUGH WHICH LENDERS
MAY AVOID LIABILITY

To avoid liability, lenders should be aware ofthe relevant facts
in Kelley and other cases that define what actions lenders may take
without fear of owner/operator liability under CERCLA. Other tools
that the lender should use to avoid risk of liability are the 1996
Amendment to CERCLA, the remaining laws enacted by Congress, and
the rules promulgated by federal and state agencies responsible for the
regulation of the environment. These devices, although essential to a
complete understanding of the effects of environmental regulations on
the lending community, are insufficient. These devices should be
supplemented by using alternative risk reduction techniques such as site
assessment reports, government programs and environmental
insurance.''
A. Site Assessment Reports
One important technique through which lenders can reduce the
risk of CERCLA liability is the use of site assessment reports. Site
assessment reports are used to determine the existence and extent of
environmental contamination. Their preparation has become common
practice in the determination of the liability risks found in a property
used as collateral. 02 These reports must be performed by an
environmental engineering firm. Furthermore, the lender should
require the borrower to have such a report prepared at the borrowers
own expense, by a reputable firm, and in a manner that can be
understood by all involved."°3
°Z & Z Leasing, Inc. v. Graying Reel, Inc., 873 F. Supp. 51, 55 (ED. Mich. 1995).
'H. Edward Abelson, EnvironmentalRisks for Lenders, 418 PRAc. L. INST./REAL
ESTATE LAW 545, 550-579 (1997).
02
° 1d at 550-51.
1031d. at 550-79.
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B. Government Programs
Other useful instrumentalities for limiting lender liability are
government programs. Various state and federal government programs
should be researched to obtain information on how these programs can
limit lender liability in the improvement or redevelopment of
brownfields. Examples of these programs are those that finance the
cleanup or remediation of contaminated sites. Other such programs
offer financing for the redevelopment of economically distressed areas
that may be affected by environmental contamination.°' Therefore, the
use of these programs eliminates or reduces the risk of lender liability
because the financial burden of any environmental hazards are shifted
to the government.
C. Environmental Insurance
In the past, environmental insurance was not always a practical
method for reducing the risk of lender liability partially due to the
extremely high costs of such coverage. However, over time this device
has gained much more favor." 5 The increased use of environmental
insurance has been attributed to the reduction in policy prices and the
willingness of underwriters to negotiate contract terms that create a
06
clearer understanding of the terms of the contracts involved.
There are several different types of coverage available to
lenders, and these policies should be assessed to fit the individual needs
of each financing arrangement. One type of insurance that is available
is environmental remediation insurance."17 This type of policy covers
investigation, defense, and remediation costs involved with the cleanup
of contamination on the insured's property. It also covers the costs of
the cleanup of adjacent contaminated property if hazardous substances
have traveled from the insured's property.0's Another type, pollution
legal liability insurance, covers third parties for off-site bodily injury,
property damage, and cleanup costs. 0 9 However, this type of insurance
does not cover remediation costs and only covers the expenses
stemming from the emanation of contamination from a designated
41d. at 556-57.
'O'ld. at 569-70.
106/d

'O'Id at 571.
1
0ld.at 571.
at 571-72.
"'I'd
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property."' A third type, integrated environmental insurance, has the
same coverage as environmental remediation insurance but also
includes coverage for bodily injury."' A fourth type, top loss
insurance, covers remediation costs only and involves the insured
paying a deductible that is equal to the estimated costs of remediation
of property known to be contaminated while the insurer covers any
costs in excess of the deductible." 2 Finally, future contamination
insurance covers the future costs of cleanup and remediation resulting
from the ongoing operations of the insured."1 3
V. CONCLUSION

The importance of limiting lender liability under CERCLA
cannot be stressed too strongly. The entire brownfields redevelopment
movement will be hindered if lenders refuse to finance the
redevelopment of brownfields because of the belief that they may be
exposed to potentially unlimited liability for cleanup and remediation
costs. Hence, lenders must come to understand the limitations of this
liability so that they may have greater certainty that the will not be
deemed liable as owners or operators under CERCLA. By loaning
money for the improvement and redevelopment of brownfields, the
lender's share of the commercial lending market will be increased, thus,
lenders will be directly benefitted. This increase in market share could
result from the available brownfields projects that have yet to be
tapped.
Kelley enables lenders to have a clearer picture of what actions
they may take while still avoiding liability for environmental
contamination as owners or operators under CERCLA. Since Kelley is
limited in its scope, lenders may also look to the 1996 Amendment to
CERCLA and other court cases to determine ways to avoid liability.
Additionally, lenders may seek ways to limit their exposure to
environmental liability through the use of site assessment reports,
governmental programs, and environmental insurance. Although the
journey toward eliminating lenders' fears of liability is far from
complete, the financial community can look to the impressive
advancements in the area of brownfields legislation as a sign of better
days ahead.
1'old.
11id. at 572.
1121d.
3
111d.

